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Abstract
In this paper, we study liquid democracy, a collective decision making paradigm which
lies between direct and representative democracy. One main feature of liquid democracy is
that voters can delegate their votes in a transitive manner so that: A delegates to B and B
delegates to C leads to A delegates to C. Unfortunately, this process may not converge as
there may not even exist a stable state (also called equilibrium). In this paper, we investigate
the stability of the delegation process in liquid democracy when voters have restricted types
of preference on the agent representing them (e.g., single-peaked preferences). We show that
various natural structures of preferences guarantee the existence of an equilibrium and we
obtain both tractability and hardness results for the problem of computing several equilibria
with some desirable properties.
1 Introduction
Interactive democracy aims at using modern information technology, as Social Networks (SN),
in order to make democracy more flexible, interactive and accurate [Bri18]. One of its most well
known implementation is known as Liquid Democracy (LD) [GA15]. In a nutshell, LD allows voters
to delegate transitively along an SN. More precisely, each voter may decide to vote directly or to
delegate her vote to one of her neighbors, i.e., to use a representative. In LD this representative
can in turn delegate her vote and the votes that have been delegated to her to someone else. As a
result, the delegations of the voters will flow along the SN until they reach a voter who decides to
vote. This voter is called the guru of the people she represents and has a voting weight equal to
the number of people who directly or indirectly delegated to her. This approach is implemented
in several online tools [BKNS14, HL15] and has been used by several political parties (e.g, the
German Pirate party or the Sweden’s Demoex party). One main advantage of this framework is
its flexibility, as it enables voters to vote directly for issues on which they feel both concerned and
expert and to delegate for others.
On the other hand, one concern in LD is the stability of the induced delegation process
[BGL19, EGPL19]. Indeed, as the preferences of voters over their possible gurus can be con-
flicting, this process may end up in an unstable situation (i.e., a situation in which some voters
would change their delegations). Unfortunately, Escoffier et al. [EGPL19] showed that an equi-
librium of LD’s delegation process may not exist, and that the existence of such an equilibrium
is even NP-hard to decide. In this work, we obtain more positive results by considering several
structures of preferences. We show that various natural structures of preferences guarantee the
existence of an equilibrium and we obtain both tractability and hardness results for the problem
of computing several equilibria with some desirable properties.
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2 Related Work
Algorithmic issues of LD have recently raised attention in the AI literature. The idea underlying LD
is that its flexibility should allow each voter to make an informed vote either by voting directly, or
by finding a suitable guru. Several works have investigated this claim leading to both positive and
negative results [GA15, KMP18]. On the one hand, Green-Armytage [GA15], proposed a spacial
voting setting in which transitive delegations decrease on average a loss measure measuring how
well the votes represent the voters. On the other hand, Kahng et al. [KMP18], studied an election
on a binary issue with a ground truth. In their model, no “local” procedure (i.e., a procedure
working locally on the SN to organize delegations) can guarantee that LD is, at the same time,
never less accurate and sometimes strictly more accurate than direct voting.
A possible pitfall of liquid democracy is that some agents may amass an enormous voting power.
This issue was addressed by Gölz et al. [GKMP18] who considered the problem of minimizing the
maximal weight of a guru given some delegations constraints. The authors designed a (1+ log(n))-
approximation algorithm (where n is the number of voters) and show that approximating the
problem within a factor 12 log2(n) is NP-hard. Lastly, the authors gave evidence that allowing
voters to specify multiple possible delegation options (instead of one) leads to a large decrease of
the maximum voting power of a voter.
Christoff and Grossi [CG17] studied the potential loss of a rationality constraint when voters
should vote on different issues that are logically linked and for which they delegate to different
representatives. Following this work, Brill and Talmon [BT18] considered an LD framework in
which each voter should provide a linear order over possible candidates. To do so each voter may
delegate different binary preference queries to different proxies. The delegation process may then
yield incomplete and even intransitive preference orders. Notably, the authors showed that it is
NP-hard to decide if an incomplete ballot obtained in this way can be completed to obtain complete
and transitive preferences while respecting the constraints induced by the delegations.
Lastly, the stability of the delegation process of LD has been studied [BGL19, EGPL19]. Bloem-
bergen et al. [BGL19] considered an LD setting where voters are connected in an SN and can only
delegate to their neighbors in the network. The election is on a binary issue for which some voters
should vote for the 0 answer and the others should vote for the 1 answer. Each voter only knows in
a probabilistic way what is the correct choice for her, as well as for the others. This modeling leads
to a class of games, called delegation games in which each voter aims at maximizing the accuracy
of her vote/delegation. The authors proved the existence of pure Nash equilibria in several types of
delegation games and gave upper and lower bounds on the price of anarchy, and the gain (i.e., the
difference between the accuracy of the group after the delegation process and the one induced by
direct voting) of such games. Following this line of research, Escoffier et al. [EGPL19] considered
a more general type of delegation games in which voters have a preference order over who could be
their guru, and each voter aims at being represented by the best possible one. The authors showed
that an equilibrium may not exist in this type of delegation games. In fact, the existence of such
an equilibrium is NP-hard to decide even if the SN is complete or is of bounded degree and it is
W[1]-hard when parametrized by the treewidth of the SN. Then, the authors showed that such an
equilibrium is guaranteed to exist, whatever the preferences of the voters, if and only if the SN is
a tree and provided dynamic programming procedures to compute some equilibria with desirable
properties.
In this work, we take an orthogonal approach to the one of Escoffier et al. [EGPL19]. Indeed,
instead of investigating the effect of the properties of the SN on the equilibria of LD’s delegation
process, we put our emphasise on voters’ preferences. More precisely, we assume that the SN is
complete and we investigate several types of structured preferences that guarantee the existence
of an equilibrium.
3 Notations, Settings and Overview of the Results
3.1 Notations and Nash-Stable Delegation Functions
Following the notations of Escoffier et al. [EGPL19], we denote by N = {1, . . . , n} a set of voters
that take part in a vote. In this former work, these voters were connected in a SN such that each
voter could only delegate directly to their neighbors in the network. In this work, we assume that
any voter can delegate directly to any other voter. This is equivalent to considering a complete
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SN. Hence, each voter i can either vote herself, delegate to another voter j, or abstain. We denote
by d : N → N ∪ {0} a delegation function such that d(i) = i if voter i declares intention to vote,
d(i) = j with j ∈ N \ {i} if i delegates to j, and d(i) = 0 if i declares intention to abstain. The
set of gurus Gu(d) is defined as the set of voters that vote given the delegations prescribed by d,
i.e., Gu(d) = {i ∈ N | d(i) = i}. Delegations are transitive which means that if d(i) = j, d(j) = k,
and d(k) = k, then i is represented by k. In the end, the voter who votes for i, called the guru of
i and denoted by gu(i, d), is the voter in Gu(d) ∪ {0} attained by following the delegations of the
voters from i. Note that the successive delegations starting from i may also end up in a circuit. In
this case, we consider that all voters in the chain of delegations abstain, as none of them take the
responsibility to vote.
Each voter i has a preference order ≻i over who could be their guru in N ∪{0}. For every voter
i ∈ N , and for every j, k ∈ N ∪ {0} we have that j ≻i k if i prefers to delegate to j (or to vote
if j = i, or to abstain if j = 0) rather than to delegate to k (or to vote if k = i, or to abstain if
k = 0). We say that voter i is an abstainer in P if she prefers to abstain rather than to vote, i.e.,
if 0 ≻i i; she is a non-abstainer otherwise. The set of abstainers is denoted by A. The collection
of these preference orders defines a preference profile P = {≻i | i ∈ N}.
For illustrative purposes, we now give an example of a preference profile.
Example 1 (Ex. 3.2 in [EGPL19]). Consider the following preferences with n=3 voters:
1 : 2 ≻1 1 ≻1 3 ≻1 0
2 : 3 ≻2 2 ≻2 1 ≻2 0
3 : 1 ≻3 3 ≻3 2 ≻3 0
In this example, each voter i prefers to delegate to (i mod 3) + 1 rather than to vote directly and
each voter prefers to vote rather than to abstain.
A delegation function d is said to be Nash-stable for voter i if
gu(i, d) ≻i g ∀g ∈ (Gu(d) ∪ {0, i}) \ {gu(i, d)}.
A delegation function d is Nash-stable if it is Nash-stable for every voter in N . A Nash-stable
delegation function is also called an equilibrium in the sequel. Unfortunately, as noted in [EGPL19]
such an equilibrium may not exist as Example 1 admits no equilibrium. In fact, sets of gurus of
Nash-stable delegation functions correspond to the kernels of a particular digraph as proven by
Escoffier et al. [EGPL19] and as explained in the following subsection.
3.2 Delegation-Acceptability Graph and Existence of Equilibria
Let Acc(i) = {j ∈ N |j ≻i i and j ≻i 0} be the set of voters to which voter i would rather delegate
to than to abstain or vote directly. A necessary condition for a delegation function to be Nash-
stable is that gu(i, d) ∈ Acc(i) for every voter i who delegates to another voter. Otherwise, voter i
would change her delegation to abstain or vote directly. We refer to Acc(i) as the set of acceptable
gurus for i in a Nash-stable situation. Note that since we are interested in equilibria, we do not
require the whole preference profile as input. Namely, the preferences of agent i below 0 or i in
her preference list have no influence on equilibria. In the sequel, we may define a preference profile
only by giving, for every agent i, if she is an abstainer or not, and her preference profile on Acc(i).
Definition 1 ([EGPL19]). The delegation-acceptability digraph is the digraph G∗P = (N \A, AP )
where AP = {(i, j) | j ∈ Acc(i)}.
Stated differently, there exists an arc from non-abstainer i to non-abstainer j if and only if i
accepts j as a guru.
Example 2. Let us consider the preference profile P on 4 voters {1, 2, 3, 4} given on the left side
of Figure 1. Its delegation-acceptability digraph G∗P is represented on the right side of Figure 1.
Given a digraph G = (V,A), a subset of vertices K ⊆ V is independent if there is no arc
between two vertices of K. It is absorbing if for every vertex u /∈ K, there exists k ∈ K such
that (u, k) ∈ A (then we say that k absorbs u). A kernel of G is a subset of vertices that is both
independent and absorbing.
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1 : 2 ≻1 1 ≻1 3 ≻1 4 ≻1 0
2 : 3 ≻2 4 ≻2 2 ≻2 1 ≻2 0
3 : 2 ≻3 1 ≻3 3 ≻3 4 ≻3 0
4 : 3 ≻4 4 ≻4 2 ≻4 1 ≻4 0
1 2 3 4
Figure 1: Delegation-acceptability digraph G∗P .
Theorem 1 ([EGPL19]). Given a preference profile P and a subset K ⊆ N \ A of voters, there
exists an equilibrium d such that Gu(d) = K if and only if K is a kernel of G∗P .
For instance, in Example 2 the only kernel of G∗P is {1, 4} which corresponds to the equilibrium
where voters 1 and 4 vote, voter 2 delegates to voter 4 and voter 3 delegates to voter 1.
Note that given a set K which is a kernel of G∗P , it is straightforward to retrieve an equilibrium
d such that Gu(d) = K. E.g., the delegation function where every voter in K votes, and every
voter not in K delegates to her preferred voter in K, is Nash-stable. Hence, surprisingly, given
any equilibrium d, there exists an equilibrium d′ such that gu(i, d) = gu(i, d′) for every voter i and
where each voter delegates directly to her guru in d′. Note however that the transitivity property
of delegations is crucial to our setting as it is at the root of the instability of the delegation process.
The problem of determining if an equilibrium exists is equivalent to the problem of determin-
ing if a digraph admits a kernel which is NP-complete [Chv73]. Interestingly, we will show in
the sequel that for several natural structured preference profiles (e.g., single-peaked profiles) an
equilibrium always exists. For these structured preference profiles we will investigate if we can
compute equilibria verifying particular desirable properties, and tackle convergence issues.
3.3 Problems Investigated
3.3.1 Optimization and decision problems on equilibria.
We investigate the same decision and optimization problems as in [EGPL19] which are all related
to the equilibria of LD’s delegation process.
Firstly, given a voter i ∈ N \A, problemMEMB aims at deciding if there exists an equilibrium
for which i is a guru.
MEMB
INSTANCE: A preference profile P and a voter i ∈ N \ A.
QUESTION: Does there exist an equilibrium d for which i ∈ Gu(d)?
Also, we will try to find equilibria that are optimal w.r.t. some objective functions. First,
problem MINDIS tries to find an equilibrium that satisfies most the voters, where the dissat-
isfaction of a voter i ∈ N with respect to a delegation function d is given by rk(i, d) − 1 where
rk(i, d) is the rank of gu(i, d) in the preference profile of i. Second, problem MINMAXVP tries
to avoid that a guru would amass too much voting power, where the voting power vp(i, d) of a
guru i ∈ N w.r.t. a delegation function d is defined as vp(i, d) = |{j ∈ N|gu(j, d) = i}|. Last,
problem MINABST tries to determine an equilibrium d minimizing the number of people who
abstain, i.e., |{i ∈ N|gu(i, d) = 0}|.
Problems MINDIS, MINMAXVP and MINABST
INSTANCE: A preference profile P .
SOLUTION: A Nash-stable delegation function d.
MEASURE for MINDIS:
∑
i∈N (rk(i, d)− 1) (to minimize).
MEASURE for MINMAXVP: maxi∈Gu(d) vp(i, d) (to minimize).
MEASURE for MINABST: |{i ∈ N|gu(i, d) = 0}| (to minimize).
3.3.2 Convergence of Iterative Delegations.
As we will focus on instances where an equilibrium always exists, a natural question is whether
a dynamic delegation process (necessarily) converges. As classically done in game theory (see
e.g. [NSVZ11]), we consider dynamics where iteratively one voter has the possibility to change her
delegation/vote.
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In a dynamics, we are given a starting delegation function d0 and a token function T : N∗ → N
which specifies that voter T (t) has the token at step t: she has the right to change her delegation.
This gives a sequence of delegation functions (dt)t∈N where for any t ∈ N∗, if j 6= T (t) then
dt(j) = dt−1(j). A dynamics is said to converge if there is a t∗ such that for all t ≥ t∗, dt = dt∗ .
Given d0 and T , a dynamics is called a better response dynamics or Improved Response Dynamics
(IRD) if for all t, T (t) chooses a move that strictly improves her outcome if any, otherwise does not
change her delegation; it is called a Best Response Dynamics (BRD) if for all t, T (t) chooses dt(i)
so as to maximize her outcome. Note that a BRD is also an IRD. We will assume, as usual, that
each voter has the token infinitely many times. A classical way of choosing such a function T is to
consider a permutation σ over the voters in N , and to repeat this permutation over time to give
the token (if t = r mod n then T (t) = σ(r)). These dynamics are called permutation dynamics.
The last problems that we investigate, denoted by IR-CONV and BR-CONV, can be for-
malized as:
IR-CONV (resp. BR-CONV)
QUESTION: Does a dynamic delegation process under IRD (resp. BRD) nec-
essarily converges whatever the preference profile P and token function T .
3.4 Summary of the Results
As explained above, our purpose is to investigate the problems under restricted preferences. In
Section 4, we study single-peaked preference profiles, where agents are ordered on a line and they
prefer gurus that are “close” to them on this axis. In Section 5, we investigate symmetrical pref-
erence profiles, where all pair of voters always accept each other as guru, or reject each other.
Finally, as classically done in the framework of spatial preferences [BL07], we consider in Section 6
that voters are embedded in a metric space. They accept as possible gurus voters that are close
to them in this space. We denote these preference profiles as distance-based profiles.
For each of these preference structures, we first show that an equilibrium always exists. Our re-
sults for problems IR-CONV,BR-CONV,MEMB,MINDIS,MINMAXVP andMINABST
are presented in Table 1. Note that all missing proofs are deferred to the Appendices.
Preferences IR-CONV BR-CONV MEMB MINDIS MINMAXVP MINABST
Single-Peaked Not Always Not Always O(n2) O(n3) O(n3) O(n3)
Symmetrical Not Always Always Always Exists NP-Hard NP-Hard NP-Hard
Distance-Based Not Always Always NP-Complete NP-Hard NP-Hard NP-Hard
Table 1: Synthesis of Results.
4 Single-Peaked Preferences
4.1 Definition
In this section, we consider that voters can be ordered on a line; this ordering < may represent,
e.g., the political positions of the voters on a left-right ladder. We assume that voters are indexed
w.r.t. this ordering and we identify them with their index in {1, . . . , n}. A preference profile is
single-peaked for voter i ∈ N if for every j, k ∈ N ,
(i < j < k or k < j < i) =⇒ j ≻i k.
A preference profile is single-peaked if it is single-peaked for all voters. For instance, the preference
profile given in Example 2 is single-peaked.
In a Single-Peaked (SP) preference profile, if a voter delegates to a guru on her left (and similarly
on her right), she prefers to delegate to the closest possible. Note that in i’s preference list, we
allow i (vote) and 0 (abstention) to be in any position (differently from the traditional definition of
single-peakedness). It represents the fact that voter i prefers to delegate to close gurus, but then,
beyond a given threshold on her left (resp. right), she prefers to abstain or vote herself rather than
to delegate to a guru that is too far from her opinions.
SP preferences are one of the most well-known restrictions of preferences in social choice theory.
They where introduced by Black [Bla48] who showed that they solve the Condorcet paradox in the
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sense that a weak Condorcet winner always exists with SP preferences. Furthermore, SP electorates
have many desirable properties: they induce a simple characterization of strategy proof voting
schemes [Mou80]; they are easily recognizable [ELÖ08]; and they often lead to more desirable
complexity results (e.g., in multiwinner elections, where the goal of the election is to elect a
committee representing best a set of voters [BSU13]).
4.2 Existence of Equilibrium
We now establish that the existence of an equilibrium is guaranteed for an SP preference profile
P . A digraph G is an interval catch digraph [Pri94] with vertex-set N = {1, . . . , n} if for every
i ∈ N , there exists li, ri ∈ N such that li ≤ i ≤ ri and the out-neighborhood of i in G is the subset
{li, . . . , ri}\{i}. These digraphs are naturally related to SP preference profiles by the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. If P is an SP preference profile, then its delegation-acceptability digraph G∗P is
an interval catch digraph.
Indeed, note first that if we remove abstainers from profile P , the remaining profile is still
single-peaked. Then by defining li (resp. ri) the smallest (resp. largest) voter that i accepts as
guru, it is easy to check that G∗P is an interval catch digraph.
Considering the preference profile from Example 2, the digraph G∗P is clearly the interval catch
digraph defined by the values l1 = 1, r1 = 2, l2 = 2, r2 = 4, l3 = 1, r3 = 3, l4 = 3 and r4 = 4.
From the equivalence stated in Theorem 1, deciding the existence of an equilibrium is equivalent
to deciding the existence of a kernel in the delegation-acceptability digraph. It was proven by
Prisner [Pri94] that a kernel in an interval catch digraph always exists and is computable in O(n2)
time. This leads to a polynomial algorithm for computing an equilibrium for an SP preference
profile.
Theorem 2. An SP preference profile always admits an equilibrium. Furthermore, an equilibrium
can be computed in O(n2).
4.3 Equilibria and Optimization
Theorem 2 addresses the question of computing one equilibrium. We now provide an additional
characterization of sets of gurus of equilibria, that will be a convenient tool for solving other
decision or optimization problems on equilibria.
Let us define an auxiliary digraph Gaux = (V aux, Aaux) associated with G∗P as follows. The
vertex-set V aux contains the set of voters {1, . . . , n}, plus a source s and a sink t. For i < j, the
arc-set Aaux contains the arc (i, j) if the pair {i, j} is a kernel of the subgraph of G∗P induced by
{i, . . . , j}. It contains the arc (s, j) (resp. the arc (i, t)) if the singleton {j} (resp. {i}) is a kernel
of the subgraph of G∗P induced by {1, . . . , j} (resp. {i, . . . , n}).
For illustration purposes, the auxiliary digraph of the preference profile from Ex. 2 is given in
Figure 2. The two successors of source s are 1 and 2: indeed the singletons {1} and {2} are kernels
of the subgraph induced by {1} and {1, 2} respectively. Vertices 3 or 4 do not absorb vertex 1,
hence they are not successors of s. Between two vertices of {1, . . . , 4} the only arc in Gaux is (1, 4),
because all other pairs of vertices are neighbors, while {1, 4} is a kernel of G∗P .
s 1 2 3 4 t
Figure 2: Auxiliary digraph Gaux of G∗P for P the preference profile of Example 2.
The importance of the auxiliary digraph is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 2. There is a one-to-one correspondence between sets of gurus of equilibria for pref-
erence profile P , and s− t paths in the auxiliary digraph of G∗P .
The proof of Proposition 2 relies on a technical lemma on kernels of interval catch digraphs,
which is stated and proven in Appendix. We obtain a one-to-one correspondence between sets of
gurus of equilibria, kernels of G∗P , and s− t paths of the auxiliary digraph. Using this result, it is
6
possible to solve problemsMEMB,MINDIS,MINMAXVP andMINABST by transforming
them into path problems in the auxiliary digraph. The results we obtain are given in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3. Given an SP preference profile P : the auxiliary digraph of G∗P is computable in
O(n2) time; problem MEMB is solvable in O(n2) time; problems MINDIS, MINMAXVP and
MINABST are solvable in O(n3) time.
Proof. (sketch) For problem MINABST we sketch the proof of the equivalence with a path
problem in Gaux (full proof of the theorem is deferred to the Appendix). Given d an equilibrium,
with Proposition 2 the set K = Gu(d) forms an s-t path in Gaux. We claim that to count the
number of voters who abstain in d, it is sufficient to sum, for every pair of successive gurus k, k′,
the number ak,k′ of voters between k and k′ who prefer abstention over k and k′. Indeed because
preferences are SP, any non-guru delegates to the closest guru on her left, or the closest guru on
her right, or abstains. Thus Gaux can be labeled on arcs with the values ai,j , andMINABST can
be solved by finding a shortest s-t path in Gaux.
4.4 Convergence of Dynamics
As Theorem 2 asserts that an equilibrium always exists in the SP case, it is worth considering
convergence of dynamics in this setting. Unfortunately, such a convergence is not guaranteed.
Indeed, Escoffier et al. [EGPL19] provide a BRD permutation dynamics that does not converge for
the preference profile of Example 2. As this profile is SP, convergence of BRDs are not guaranteed
for SP preferences.
5 Symmetrical Preference Profiles
5.1 Definition, Existence of Equilibria and Membership Problem
We consider in this section the case where the preferences are symmetrical in the sense that
i ∈ Acc(j) if and only if j ∈ Acc(i). As we will see in Section 6, this is a particular case of the
more general distance-based preference profiles. In the case of symmetrical preference profiles, the
delegation-acceptability digraph has the arc (i, j) iff it has the arc (j, i) (it is symmetrical). Then,
as noted in [EGPL19], the existence of an equilibrium is trivially guaranteed (take any maximal
independent set of G∗P ), and for any non-abstainer i there exists an equilibrium in which i is a
guru (take a maximal independent set containing i).
5.2 Equilibria and Optimization
Though the existence of equilibrium is trivial in the case of symmetrical preference profiles, we now
show thatMINDIS,MINMAXVP andMINABST are computationally hard, in contrast with
the results of the SP case. These results, as well as another hardness result in Section 6.2, are all
based on a reduction from the 3-Satisfiability (3-SAT) problem, known to be NP-complete [GJ90],
and use the same gadget digraph that we present now.
3-SATISFIABILITY (abbreviated by 3-SAT)
INSTANCE: A set U of nu binary variables, a collection C of nc disjunctive
clauses of 3 literals, where a literal is a variable or a negated variable in U .
QUESTION : Is there a truth assignment for U that satisfies all clauses in C?
To an instance (U,C) of 3-SAT we associate the symmetrical digraph GU,C defined as follows:
• For each variable xi ∈ U , we create two adjacent vertices vxit and v
x
if , called variables vertices,
representing respectively the literals xi and xi.
• For each clause cj ∈ C we create one vertex vcj , called clause vertex; v
c
j is adjacent to the
three vertices corresponding to the three literals in cj .
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To illustrate this construction, consider the following 3-SAT instance:
U = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5} (1)
C = {(x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ¬x3), (¬x2 ∨ ¬x4 ∨ x1), (¬x1 ∨ x3 ∨ x5)} (2)
Figure 3 gives the corresponding digraph GU,C .
vx1t v
x
2t v
x
3t v
x
4t v
x
5t
vx1f v
x
2f v
x
3f v
x
4f v
x
5f
vc1 v
c
2 v
c
3
Figure 3: Gadget digraph GU,C
Observation 1. GU,C has a kernel containing no clause vertex if and only if (U,C) is satisfiable.
From this construction we derive the following hardness results.
Theorem 4. Given a symmetrical preference profile P :
– it is NP-hard to decide whether there exists an equilibrium where no voter abstains, or not. Thus,
in particular, MINABST is NP-hard.
– MINDIS is NP-hard even if there are no abstainers.
– MINMAXVP is NP-hard even if there are no abstainers.
Proof. We only prove the first item (see the Appendix for the two other items), which directly
follows from Observation 1. Let us consider a 3-SAT instance with a set U of variables and a set C
of clauses. We create a preference profile with 2nu voters vxit and v
x
if , i = 1, . . . , nu, and nc voters
vcj , j = 1, . . . , nc. A voter v
c
j accepts to delegate to the 3 voters corresponding to the three literals
in the clause (and they accept her by symmetry), and then vcj prefers to abstain. Moreover, v
x
it and
vxif also accept to delegate to each other. Then they prefer to vote. Then an equilibrium where
nobody (no voter vcj) abstains corresponds to a kernel in GU,C with no clause vertex. The result
follows from Observation 1.
5.3 Convergence of Dynamics
We now focus on the question of convergence under BRD in the case of symmetrical preference
profiles. Interestingly, while there might be cycles in the SP case, we show now that under BRD
the convergence is guaranteed under symmetrical profiles, and that this convergence occurs within
a small number of steps.
Given a dynamics with token function T , let us define rounds as follows:
• The first round is [1, r1] where r1 is the smallest r such that each voter receives the token at
least once in [1, r].
• The kst round is [rk−1 + 1, rk] where rk is the smallest r such that each voter receives the
token at least once in [rk−1 + 1, r].
For instance, in the case of permutation dynamics, we have rk = kn.
Theorem 5. Given a symmetrical preference profile P , a BRD dynamics always converges in at
most 3 rounds.
Intuitively, one can show that symmetry implies that when a voter decides to vote she will not
change her mind later. Then after two rounds the set of gurus is fixed, and in the third round each
non-guru chooses her best guru, leading to a Nash equilibrium (see Appendix).
We now show that convergence is not guaranteed under better response dynamics, thus provid-
ing a notable difference between the two dynamics. This holds even if we start from the delegation
d0 where all voters declare intention to vote, as shown by the following example.
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Example 3. Let us consider the case of 4 voters, where Acc(1) = Acc(3) = {2, 4}, Acc(2) =
Acc(4) = {1, 3}. They all prefer to vote than to abstain.
We give the token to 1, 2, 1, 3, 2, 4, 3, 1, 4 . . .. Then the following is compatible with better re-
sponse: d1(1) = 2, d2(2) = 3, d3(1) = 1, d4(3) = 4, d5(2) = 2, d6(4) = 1, d7(3) = 3, d8(1) = 2,
d9(4) = 4. At this point d9 = d2, so this is a cycle. Intuitively, each voter i delegates to its neighbor
i+1 (modulo 4); in the following step i+1 delegates to i+2, then we give the token back to i who
is no more happy with her delegation and decides to vote herself.
6 Distance-Based Preference Profiles
6.1 Definition and Existence of Equilibria
In this section, we restrict our attention to another type of structured preference profiles. We
assume that to each pair (i, j) of voters is associated a distance dist(i, j) = dist(j, i) ∈ R+. Then,
each voter i has its own acceptability threshold ρi ∈ R+: she accepts as possible gurus the other
voters that are at distance at most ρi from her:
∀j ∈ N\{i}, j ∈ Acc(i)⇔ dist(i, j) ≤ ρi
We say that such a preference profile is DB (Distance Based). An example is given in Appendix
10 for illustration purposes (see Example 4).
Note that DB preference profiles may represent the case where voters are embedded in a metric
space, as in spatial models of preferences [BL07]. They might be points in Rk (as in the example
in appendix); they may also represent vertices of a given graph, the distance being the shortest
path between vertices in the graph.
Any symmetrical preference profile is DB: indeed, consider the distance defined by dist(i, j) = 1
if and only if j ∈ Acc(i) (or, equivalently for a symmetrical profile, i ∈ Acc(j)), and dist(i, j) = 2
otherwise, and set ρi = 1 for any voter i. From this observation we immediately know that
MINDIS, MINMAXVP and MINABST are NP-hard in the case of DB preference profiles.
We now show that the existence of equilibrium, which was trivially guaranteed in the symmet-
rical case, is also guaranteed in this more general case.
Theorem 6. If preferences are DB, a preference profile always admits an equilibrium. Further-
more, an equilibrium can be computed in O(n2).
Proof. We give a O(n2) procedure that builds an equilibrium for any DB preference profile. Build
a set K of voters by using the following recursive procedure. Let S = N \A. Then, while S is not
empty, add to K the voter i of S with smallest ρi value and remove i from S as well as all voters
accepting i as guru. At the end of this process, K = {i1, . . . , im} is a kernel of G∗P . It is absorbing
because each voter in N \K has at some point been removed from S because it was absorbed by
one element of K. It is also independent. Indeed, let us assume by contradiction that ik accepts
to delegate to il with ik, il ∈ K. Then, necessarily ik has been added to K before il. Otherwise,
ik would have been removed from S at the same time as il and would not have been added to K.
Hence, ρik ≤ ρil and il accepts to delegate to ik which is not possible by the same argument. This
procedure builds K in O(n2) and the equilibrium induced by K can easily be build in O(n2).
We note that the proof does not rely on the fact that dist is a distance: an equilibrium always
exists as soon as dist(i, j) = dist(j, i), even if the triangle inequality does not hold for instance.
6.2 Membership Problem
Given that an equilibrium always exist, we now focus on the problem MEMB. In the case of
symmetrical preferences, any voter could be a guru. We show here a drastic difference in the case
of DB preferences, as MEMB becomes NP-hard.
Theorem 7. MEMB is NP-hard in the case of DB preference profiles, even if there are no
abstainers.
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Proof. (sketch) We only give the way the reduction is built (see Appendix for the full proof). Let
us consider a 3-SAT instance with a set U of variables and a set C of clauses. We consider a graph
made of:
• The undirected version of the graph GU,C associated to (U,C) (see Figure 3 in Section 5);
• Two adjacent vertices vt and vq; vt is also adjacent to all clause vertices vcj .
Each vertex of this graph is a voter (we have 2nu+nc+2 voters), and the distance between voters
i and j is the shortest path (number of edges, the graph is unweighted) between the two vertices
representing i and j in the graph. The acceptability threshold is 1 for all voters except vq which
has an acceptability threshold of 2; they all prefer to vote than to abstain. We can show that
the 3-SAT instance is satisfiable iff the DB profile induced by the corresponding distance admits a
Nash-stable delegation function in which vq is a guru.
6.3 Convergence of Dynamics
Since an equilibrium always exists, we consider now the convergence of dynamics. Example 3
shows that, under better response, the convergence is not guaranteed in the case of symmetrical
preference profiles. Therefore, it is the same in the case of DB preference profiles. We now extend
Theorem 5 and show that under BRD the convergence is guaranteed under DB preference profiles.
Theorem 8. Given a DB preference profile, a BRD dynamics always converges.
Proof. (sketch) The full proof is given in Appendix. Let us recall that each voter has the token
infinitely many times. Consider a DB preference profile P , and a BRD dynamics with a starting
delegation d0 and a token function T . We assume that voters are numbered 1, 2 . . . , n in such a
way that ρi ≤ ρi+1, i = 1, . . . , n− 1.
Let us define G as the set of voters which are gurus (vote) infinitely many times in the dynamics:
G = {i1, . . . , is} with i1 ≤ i2 ≤ · · · ≤ is. Note that, obviously, G contains no abstainers. Since
voters in N \G are gurus finitely many times, let us consider a step t0 such that, for any t ≥ t0,
no voter in N \G are gurus (they always delegate or abstain). Let t1 be the first time t > t0 such
that i1 has the token and decides to vote. Since i1 decides to vote at t1, no voter in Acc(i1) is a
guru. Then, while i1 is a guru:
• no voter j > i1 in Acc(i1) ever becomes a guru: indeed, since ρi are in non decreasing order,
if j ∈ Acc(i1) then i1 ∈ Acc(j). While i1 is a guru j does not decide to vote.
• no voter j < i1 in Acc(i1) ever becomes a guru: indeed, these are in N \G and since t1 ≥ t0
we know that they always delegate or abstain.
Then no voter in Acc(i1) becomes a guru, so i1 will vote (be a guru) forever. By recursively defining
tk as the first time t > tk−1 such that ik has the token and decides to vote, we can show using
similar arguments that ik remains a guru forever after time tk. Thus, at time ts: voters in G are
gurus forever, and voters in N \G never become gurus. From ts we only have to wait for another
round to reach a Nash-stable delegation function.
We note that, as in the proof of existence of equilibrium, we made here no specific assumption
on the function dist except that dist(i, j) = dist(j, i).
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We have investigated the stability of the delegation process in liquid democracy when voters have
restricted types of preference on the agent representing them. Interestingly, while the existence of
an equilibrium of this process is NP-hard to decide when preferences are unrestricted [EGPL19],
we have showed that various natural structures of preference, namely single-peaked, symmetrical
and distance-based preferences, guarantee the existence of an equilibrium. For these structures of
preference, we have obtained positive and negative results which surprisingly differ for the different
structures of preference studied. For instance, while single-peaked preferences are the only ones
studied that make it possible to solve efficiently all the optimization problems that we investigated,
they also form the only type of restricted preferences studied that do not guarantee the convergence
of the delegation process under best response dynamics.
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For future work, we could extend our results to other structures of preferences. Secondly,
it would be interesting to study the price of anarchy of the delegation games induced by liquid
democracy both under unrestricted and structured preferences. A last direction would be to
extend our results to the framework of viscous democracy [BBCV11]. In this setting, the weight of
a delegation decreases exponentially with the length of the delegation path. Hence, the preferences
of an agent would be defined on the delegation paths.
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8 Appendix of Section 4
8.1 Proof of Proposition 2
We first give a technical lemma on the structure of kernels of interval catch graphs. Consider an
interval catch digraph G=(V,A) defined by the values li, ri, i ∈ V . For U ⊆ V , let G[U ] denote
the subgraph of G induced by the vertices in U .
Lemma 1. Let K ⊆ V and k1, . . . , kp be the vertices of K in increasing order. Define I0 =
{1, . . . , k1}, It = {kt, . . . , kt+1} for every t ∈ {1, . . . , p− 1}, and Ip = {kp, . . . , n}.
Then the set K is a kernel of G if and only if K∩It is a kernel of G[It] for every t ∈ {0, . . . , p}.
Proof. Assume K is a kernel of G. Clearly K ∩ It is an independent set of G[It] for every t ∈
{0, . . . , p}. Assume there exists t ∈ {1, . . . , p− 1} such that K ∩ It is not absorbing in G[It], i.e.,
there exists j such that kt < j < kt+1 and neither kt nor kt+1 are out-neighbors of j. It implies
kt < lj ≤ rj < k
t+1, and since kt and kt+1 are successive vertices of K it comes that no vertex of
K absorbs j, a contradiction. Hence K ∩ It must absorb all vertices in G[It]. Similar argument
applies for t = 0 and t = p. Hence K ∩ It is a kernel of G[It] for every t ∈ {0, . . . , p}.
Conversely, assume K ∩ It is a kernel of G[It] for every t ∈ {0, . . . , p}. Then K is clearly an
absorbing set of G. Assume it is not independent: there exist two vertices kt and kt
′
in K that
are neighbors. Assume w.l.o.g. t < t′ and (kt, kt
′
) ∈ A (this can be assumed up to reversing the
ordering of vertices). Then kt
′
is an out-neighbor of kt, which implies kt
′
≤ rkt . Since t < t′ we
have also kt+1 ≤ kt
′
. Hence kt+1 ≤ rkt and (kt, kt+1) ∈ A, and K ∩ It is not an independent set
in G[It].
We now provide the proof of Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. There is a one-to-one correspondence between sets of gurus of equilibria for the
preference profile P , and s− t paths in the auxiliary digraph of G∗P .
Proof. We prove the one-to-one correspondence between kernels of G∗P and s − t paths of G
aux.
The result then follows with Theorem 1. Since G∗P is an interval catch digraph, with Lemma 1,
a set K is a kernel of G∗P is a kernel iff: every pair {k, k
′} of successive voters in K (resp. k the
smallest element of K, k′ the largest element of K) is a kernel of the subgraph of G∗P induced by
{k, . . . , k′} (resp. {1, . . . , k}, {k′, . . . , n}). By definition of Gaux, it is equivalent with K being the
set of vertices of a s− t path in Gaux.
8.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3. Given an SP preference profile P : the auxiliary digraph of G∗P is computable in
O(n2) time; problemMEMB is solvable in O(n2) time; problems MINDIS,MINMAXVP and
MINABST are solvable in O(n3) time.
For the sake of readibility, we decompose this Theorem in Lemmas 2 to 6.
Lemma 2. Given an SP preference profile P , the auxiliary digraph Gaux of G∗P is computable in
O(n2) time.
Proof. The digraph G∗P is computable in O(n
2) time. Then we prove that it is possible to compute
in linear time the out-neighborhood of every vertex of the auxiliary digraph Gaux of G∗P . Let i ∈ N .
Define for every j > i the value r∗j = min{rk | k ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , j − 1}, i /∈ Acc(k)}. We claim that:
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the pair {i, j} is an absorbing set of G∗P [{i, . . . , j}] if and only if j ≤ r
∗
j . Indeed, if j ≤ r
∗
j , then for
every k ∈ {i+1, . . . , j− 1} either i ∈ Acc(k) or j ≤ r∗j ≤ rk: then j ∈ Acc(k). Hence in both cases
the agent k accepts i or j as a guru: {i, j} is absorbing. Conversely, if j > r∗j then by definition of
r∗j there exists k ∈ {i + 1, . . . , j − 1} such that i /∈ Acc(k) and j > rk. Then j /∈ Acc(k), and the
vertex k is neither absorbed by i nor by j.
Using this claim, we prove that the out-neighborhood of i can be computed in linear time by
the following procedure. Initialize j := i + 1 and r∗ := +∞. While j ≤ n, apply the following:
(i) If i /∈ Acc(j), j /∈ Acc(i), and j ≤ r∗, then add (i, j) to Aaux. (ii) If i /∈ Acc(j), update r∗ by
r∗ := min{r∗, rj}. (iii) Increment j.
Lemma 3. Given an SP preference profile, problem MEMB is solvable in O(n2) time.
Proof. From Proposition 2 the problem MEMB is equivalent to the problem of deciding the
existence of an s− t path in Gaux that goes through voter i, i.e., finding an s− i path and a i− t
path. It can be done in O(n2) time by computing Gaux then performing two graph searches.
Optimization problems. The optimization problems introduced in Section 1 use objective func-
tions that depend not only on the set of gurus Gu(d) but also on the values of gu(i, d) for each
voter i.
Observation 2. Let d be an equilibrium and let K = Gu(d). Then the guru gu(i, d) of every agent
i /∈ K is the guru that i prefers among: the closest voter of K on her left, the closest voter of K
on her right; and abstention.
Proof. Nash-stability implies that gu(i, d) is the preferred choice of i in K∪{0, i} (this holds for all
preferences and not only SP preferences). Let i /∈ K. Since K is the set of gurus of the equilibrium
d, it comes gu(i, d) 6= i, hence gu(i, d) is the element that i prefers in K ∪{0}. By single-peakness,
the preferred guru of i in the set K is either the closest guru on her left or the closest guru on her
right. The result follows.
A consequence is the following. Assume d is an equilibrium with set of gurus Gu(d), associated
with an s − t path of Gaux. Let (k, k′) be an arc of this path. Then from Observation 2 every
i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , k′ − 1} abstains or it has k or k′ as guru in d, i.e., gu(i, d) ∈ {0, k, k′}. Let us
present into details algorithms for solving optimization problems, based on this remark.
Lemma 4. For SP preference profiles, the problem MINDIS of finding a Nash-stable delegation
function d minimizing
∑
i∈N (rk(i, d)− 1) is solvable in O(n
3) time.
Proof. Build the auxiliary digraph Gaux. For every arc (k, k′) ∈ Aaux, compute an arc-weight wk,k′
as follows. Let i ∈ {k, . . . , k′ − 1}, i 6= s (where by abuse of notation t − 1 is n). Define a value
rk,k′ (i) by: if i 6= k, rk,k′ (i) is the rank of the preferred guru of i in {0, k, k′}\{s, t} in i’s preference
list; otherwise, rk,k′ (i) is the rank of i in i’s preference list. By Observation 2, if d is an equilibrium
in which k and k′ are two successive gurus, then for every voter i ∈ {k, . . . , k′ − 1}, it holds that
rk(i, d) = rk,k′ (i). Define now wk,k′ =
∑
i∈{k,...,k′−1}, i6=s rk,k′ (i). All weights w can be computed
in O(n3) time.
Then the total dissatisfaction associated with a Nash-stable delegation function d is equal to
the weight of the s − t path associated with its set of gurus Gu(d). An optimal solution to the
problemMINDIS can then be computed by computing a shortest s−t path for the weights w.
Lemma 5. For SP preference profiles, the problem MINMAXVP of finding a Nash-stable dele-
gation function d minimizing maxi∈Gu(d) vp(i, d) is solvable in O(n
3) time.
Proof. For every arc (i, j) of the auxiliary digraph Gaux, let wiij (resp. w
j
ij) denote the number
of voters in {i+ 1, . . . , j − 1} whose preferred guru in {0, i, j} is i (resp. j). Given an s− t path
involving a guru j, the voting power of guru j is exactly wjij + w
j
jk + 1, where (i, j) and (j, k) are
the arcs of the s − t path containing j. Hence, the problem MINMAXVP is equivalent to the
problem of finding an s − t path in the auxiliary digraph that minimizes the maximum value of
wjij + w
j
jk + 1 over pairs of consecutive arcs (i, j) and (j, k) of the path.
For every i ∈ N , w ∈ {0, . . . , n}, let M(i, w) be the minimum value W such that: there exists
an s − i path where all gurus in {1, . . . , i} have voting power at most W and i has voting power
at most w on her left. We prove that all values M(i, w) can be computed in O(n3) time. Let
j ∈ N . Assume all values have been computed for agents on the left of j. For each predecessor i
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of j in Gaux, for each value w ∈ {0, . . . , n}, form M = max{M(i, w);w + wiij + 1}, then update
M(j, wjij) := min{M(j, w
j
ij);M}. Hence all values M(j, ·) can be computed in quadratic time for
every j. Finally the valueM(t, 0) is the optimal value of theMINMAXVP optimization problem.
The auxiliary digraph Gaux can be computed in O(n2) time, and the wiij can be computed in O(n
3).
Thus the overall complexity is O(n3). Note that the optimal solution can be obtained by standard
bookkeeping techniques without increasing the complexity of the method.
Lemma 6. For SP preference profiles, the problem MINABST of finding a Nash-stable delegation
function d minimizing |{i ∈ N|gu(i, d) = 0}| is solvable in O(n3) time.
Proof. For every arc (k, k′) in the auxiliary digraph Gaux, define akk′ as the number of voters in
{k+ 1, . . . , k′ − 1} whose preferred guru in {0, k, k′} is 0. By Observation 2, if d is an equilibrium
in which k and k′ are two successive gurus, then for every voter i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , k′ − 1}, the guru
gu(i, d) of i is the most preferred guru of i in {0, k, k′}, and i abstains if and only if 0 is her
preferred guru in {0, k, k′}. Hence, the number of voters of {k + 1, . . . , k′ − 1} who abstain in d is
exactly akk′ . Thus for any equilibrium d, associated with an s − t path in the auxiliary digraph,
the total number of voters who abstain in d is equal to the sum of arc-weights a over the path.
Hence an optimal solution to the problem MINABST can then be computed by searching for a
shortest s− t path for the weights a. All arc-weights a can be computed in O(n3) time. Hence an
optimal solution to MINABST can be computed in O(n3) time.
9 Appendix of Section 5
9.1 Proof of Observation 1
Observation 1 GU,C has a kernel containing no clause vertex if and only if (U,C) is satisfiable.
Proof. If (U,C) has a satisfying assignment, then consider in GU,C the set of variable vertices
corresponding to true literals. This set is clearly independent, and absorbing since every clause
is satisfied by the assignment. Conversely, a kernel containing no clause vertex must contain
exactly one variable vertex among vxit and v
x
if (for each i). Since the set is absorbing, the literals
corresponding to this kernel satisfy all the clauses.
9.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4 Given a symmetrical preference profile P :
– it is NP-hard to decide whether there exists an equilibrium where no voter abstains, or not. Thus,
in particular, MINABST is NP-hard.
– MINDIS is NP-hard even if there are no abstainers.
– MINMAXVP is NP-hard even if there are no abstainers.
The first item has been proven in the main body of the article. We now prove the two other
items. For the sake of readability, we prove each of them in a separate lemma (lemmas 7 and 8).
Lemma 7. MINDIS is NP-hard in the case of symmetrical preference profiles, even if there are
no abstainers.
Proof. Let us consider a 3-SAT instance with a set U of variables and a set C of clauses. We will
create a preference profile the delegation acceptability digraph of which is made of:
• The digraph GU,C associated to (U,C);
• A clique {v∗, v∗1 , . . . , v
∗
k−1} of k vertices (the value of k will be given later). Every vertex of
the clique is adjacent to every clause vertex of GU,C .
Thus, we build a profile on 2nu + nc + k voters: 2nu ‘variable voters’, nc ‘clause voters’, and
k ‘clique voters’. Every voter prefers to vote than to abstain (abstention will be the last preferred
option for all voters). Each agent in {v∗1 , . . . , v
∗
k−1} have v
∗ as her first choice. Then the preferences
of voters in {v∗1 , . . . , v
∗
k−1} form a Latin-square, i.e., voter v
∗
i ’s second choice is v
∗
(i mod k−1)+1, third
choice is v∗(i+1 mod k−1)+1 and so on until v
∗
(i+k−3 mod k−1)+1 is reached. Then agent v
∗
i prefers
to delegate to voters vci , i ∈ {1, . . . , nc}, then she prefers to vote. Agent v
∗ prefers to delegate
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to voters in {v∗1 , . . . , v
∗
k−1}, then she prefers to delegate for voters in {v
c
i |i = 1, . . . , nc}, then she
prefers to vote.
For example, if we assume k = 4 and the previous 3-SAT instance (U = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5} and
C = {(x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ¬x3), (¬x2 ∨ ¬x4 ∨ x1), (¬x1 ∨ x3 ∨ x5)}), then possible preferences could be:
v∗ : v∗1 ≻v∗ v
∗
2 ≻v∗ v
∗
3 ≻v∗ v
c
1 ≻v∗ v
c
2 ≻v∗ v
c
3 ≻v∗ v
∗
v∗1 : v
∗ ≻v∗
1
v∗2 ≻v∗1 v
∗
3 ≻v∗1 v
c
1 ≻v∗1 v
c
2 ≻v∗1 v
c
3 ≻v∗1 v
∗
1
v∗2 : v
∗ ≻v∗
2
v∗3 ≻v∗2 v
∗
1 ≻v∗2 v
c
1 ≻v∗2 v
c
2 ≻v∗2 v
c
3 ≻v∗2 v
∗
2
v∗3 : v
∗ ≻v∗
3
v∗1 ≻v∗3 v
∗
2 ≻v∗3 v
c
1 ≻v∗3 v
c
2 ≻v∗3 v
c
3 ≻v∗3 v
∗
3
Every agent in {vci |i = 1, . . . , nc} first prefers to delegate to the 3 voters in {v
x
it, v
x
if |n =
1, . . . , nu} corresponding to the literals of their clause. Then, they prefer to delegate to the voters
in {v∗1 , . . . , v
∗
k−1}. Then they prefer to delegate to v
∗ and then they prefer to vote. For example,
if we assume k = 4 then possible preferences w.r.t. the previous 3-SAT instance could be:
vc1 : v
x
1t ≻vc1 v
x
2t ≻vc1 v
x
3f ≻vc1 v
∗
1 ≻vc1 v
∗
2 ≻vc1 v
∗
3 ≻vc1 v
∗ ≻vc
1
vc1
vc2 : v
x
2f ≻vc2 v
x
4f ≻vc2 v
x
1t ≻vc2 v
∗
1 ≻vc2 v
∗
2 ≻vc2 v
∗
3 ≻vc2 v
∗ ≻vc
2
vc2
vc3 : v
x
1f ≻vc3 v
x
3t ≻vc3 v
x
5t ≻vc3 v
∗
1 ≻vc3 v
∗
2 ≻vc3 v
∗
3 ≻vc3 v
∗ ≻vc
3
vc3
Lastly, each agent vxit (resp. v
x
if ) first prefers to delegate to v
x
if (resp. v
x
it), then to delegate to
voters in {vci |i = 1, . . . , nc} corresponding to clauses that include variable xi (resp. the negation of
variable xi), then they prefer to vote directly. For example, possible preferences w.r.t. the previous
3-SAT instance could be:
vx1t : v
x
1f ≻vx1t v
c
1 ≻vx1t v
c
2 ≻vx1t v
x
1t
vx2t : v
x
2f ≻vx2t v
c
1 ≻vx2t v
x
2t
vx3t : v
x
3f ≻vx3t v
c
3 ≻vx3t v
x
3t
vx4t : v
x
4f ≻vx4t v
x
4t
vx5t : v
x
5f ≻vx5t v
c
3 ≻vx5t v
x
5t
vx1f : v
x
1t ≻vx1f v
c
3 ≻vx1f v
x
1f
vx2f : v
x
2t ≻vx2f v
c
2 ≻vx2f v
x
2f
vx3f : v
x
3t ≻vx3f v
c
1 ≻vx3f v
x
3f
vx4f : v
x
4t ≻vx4f v
c
2 ≻vx4f v
x
4f
vx5f : v
x
5t ≻vx5f v
x
5f
We fix k = 3nc + nu + nunc and show that the 3-SAT instance is satisfiable if and only if there
exists an equilibrium with dissatisfaction at most 2k.
Assume first that the 3-SAT instance is satisfiable. Then, v∗ plus the nu variable vertices in
GU,C corresponding to true literals form a kernel in the delegation acceptability digraph. Let us
consider the corresponding delegation function where:
• the nu +1 voters in the kernel vote. The dissatisfaction of v∗ is (k− 1)+nc, the one of each
voter corresponding to a true literal is at most 1 + nc.
• voters v∗i delegate to v
∗, they have dissatisfaction 0;
• clause voters delegate to a variable voter corresponding to a true literal in the clause, thus
with a dissatisfaction at most 2.
• (variable) voters corresponding to false literals delegate to the opposite (true) literal and
have dissatisfaction 0.
Thus, the dissatisfaction of this equilibrium is at most k− 1 + nc + nu(1 + nc) + 2nc = 2k− 1.
Conversely, assume that there is an equilibrium with dissatisfaction at most 2k. If a voter v∗s
(6= v∗) in the clique votes, then no other clique voter votes, and this already induces a dissatisfaction
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at least
∑k−2
i=1 i =
(k−1)(k−2)
2 > 2k (for k ≥ 7) for the other k−2 vertices v
∗
j , j 6= s. Thus this is not
possible. Similarly, if a clause voter votes, then no voter in the clique can vote, and this already
induces a dissatisfaction at least (k − 1) for each voter in the clique, thus a global dissatisfaction
at least k(k − 1) > 2k (for k > 4).
Then, in the considered equilibrium, v∗ votes, no other voter in the clique votes, and no clause
voter votes. Then for any i exactly one voter among vxit and v
x
if votes. We conclude the proof by
showing that the assignment where a literal is true if the corresponding voter votes is a satisfying
assignment. Note that v∗ has dissatisfaction (k− 1)+ nc. If a clause voter delegates to v∗, then it
has dissatisfaction k + 2, so the global dissatisfaction is greater than 2k, impossible. This means
that each clause vertex delegates to a voting variable vertex, and thus all the clauses are satisfied
by the assignment.
Lemma 8. MINMAXVP is NP-hard in the case of symmetrical preference profiles, even if there
are no abstainers.
Proof. Let us consider a 3-SAT instance with a set U of variables and a set C of clauses. We will
create a preference profile, the delegation acceptability (symmetric) digraph of which is made of:
• The digraph GU,C associated to (U,C);
• A clique {v1, . . . , vnc+2} of nc + 2 vertices. Every vertex of the clique is adjacent to every
clause vertex of GU,C .
• An independent set {v′1, . . . , v
′
nc+2} of nc + 2 vertices. Every vertex v
′
i is adjacent to vi.
Figure 4 illustrates the digraph corresponding to the following 3-SAT instance:
U = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5} (3)
C = {(x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ¬x3), (¬x2 ∨ ¬x4 ∨ x1), (¬x1 ∨ x3 ∨ x5)} (4)
vx1t
vx2t
vx3t
vx4t
vx5t
vx1f
vx2f
vx3f
vx4f
vx5f
vc1
vc2
vc3
v1
v5
v2
v4
v3
v′1
v′2
v′3
v′4
v′5
Figure 4: Delegation acceptability digraph.
Thus we build a profile on 2nu + 3nc + 4 voters, all of them prefer to vote than to abstain.
We first precise the preferences of voters in {v1, . . . , vnc+2}. Each voter in {v1, . . . , vnc+2} prefers
first to delegate to voters in {vcj |j = 1, . . . , nc} and in the same order, v
c
1 first, v
c
2 second and so
on. Then, they prefer to delegate to the other voters in {v1, . . . , vnc+2}, then to the corresponding
v′j and lastly, they prefer to vote. For example, in the instance described by Equations 3 and 4,
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possible preferences are given by:
v1 : v
c
1 ≻v1 v
c
2 ≻v1 v
c
3 ≻v1 v2 ≻v1 v3 ≻v1 v4 ≻v1 v5 ≻v1 v
′
1 ≻v1 v1
v2 : v
c
1 ≻v2 v
c
2 ≻v2 v
c
3 ≻v2 v1 ≻v2 v3 ≻v2 v4 ≻v2 v5 ≻v2 v
′
2 ≻v2 v2
v3 : v
c
1 ≻v3 v
c
2 ≻v3 v
c
3 ≻v3 v1 ≻v3 v2 ≻v3 v4 ≻v3 v5 ≻v3 v
′
3 ≻v3 v3
v4 : v
c
1 ≻v4 v
c
2 ≻v4 v
c
3 ≻v4 v1 ≻v4 v2 ≻v4 v3 ≻v4 v5 ≻v4 v
′
4 ≻v4 v4
v5 : v
c
1 ≻v5 v
c
2 ≻v5 v
c
3 ≻v5 v1 ≻v5 v2 ≻v5 v3 ≻v5 v4 ≻v5 v
′
5 ≻v5 v5
Without defining further the other preferences, we will show the following result: the 3-SAT
instance is satisfiable iff there exists a Nash-stable delegation function in which each guru has a
voting power which is strictly less than nc+3. Indeed, note that if some voters in {vcj |j = 1, . . . , nc}
are gurus, then one of them will be endorsed by all voters in {v1, . . . , vnc+2} and will thus have
a power of at least nc + 3. Additionally, if one voter in {v1, . . . , vnc+2} is a guru, then she will
collect the votes of all other voters in {v1, . . . , vnc+2} and the vote of the corresponding v
′
i and
will thus have a power of at least nc + 3. Hence, a Nash-stable delegation function in which
each guru has a power which is strictly less than nc + 3 corresponds to a Nash-stable delegation
function in which no voters in {v1, . . . , vnc+2} ∪ {v
c
j |j = 1, . . . , nc} are gurus. This is possible if
all voters in {v′1, . . . , v
′
nc+2} are gurus and if each voter in {v
c
j |j = 1, . . . , nc} delegates to a guru
in {vxit, v
x
if |i = 1, . . . , nu}. In this case, the power of a guru is at most nc + 2 and the gurus in
{vxit, v
x
if |i = 1, . . . , nu} form a truth assignment that satisfies all clauses.
9.3 Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 5. Given a symmetric preference profile P , a BRD dynamics always converges in at
most 3 rounds.
Proof. Let us consider j = T (t) for some step t. Suppose that j decides to vote herself when she
has the token at time t. Then, for any t′ ≥ t, j remains a guru. Indeed, since she decides to vote
at time t, it means that no voter in Acc(j) were gurus. While j is a guru, then a voter i ∈ Acc(j)
cannot become a guru under BRD since by symmetry j ∈ Acc(i).
For a voter j, consider a time t in the second round where she receives the token.
• if j decides to vote, from the previous argument she will be a guru forever after time t.
• if j delegates (directly or indirectly) to a guru i, since we are in the second round i already
had the token, already decided to be a guru, and thus by the previous argument will remain
a guru forever. Then, j will never be a guru (i ∈ Acc(j) will always be available as a guru).
• If j abstains, then she prefers to abstain than to vote so she will never be a guru.
This means that after the second round the set of gurus is fixed. Then, in the third round, gurus
remain gurus, and non gurus choose their most preferred guru in the set of gurus, or abstain (if
they prefer to abstain than to vote or to delegate to a guru). Thus we reach an equilibrium at the
end of the third round.
Note that 3 rounds are necessary. Consider for instance a profile with 3 voters, 1 prefers 2 and
then to vote, 3 prefers 2 and then to vote, and 2 prefers 1, then 3, and then to vote. We give
the token to 1,2,3 (first round), 2,3,1 (second round), 1, 3, 2 (third round). Under BRD we get
d1(1) = 2, d2(2) = 3, d3(3) = 3 (end of the first round, 3 is a guru), d4(2) = 3, d5(3) = 3, d6(1) = 1
(end of the second round, the set of gurus {1,3} is definitive), d7(1) = 1, d8(3) = 3, d9(2) = 1 (end
of the third round, convergence).
10 Appendix of Section 6
10.1 Example of Distance-Based profile
Example 4. Consider 5 voters that are points in the following 2-dimentional grid (2 is at coordi-
nates (0, 0), 1 is at coordinate (0, 1), 4 at coordinates (2, 0),. . . ).
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12 3 4
5
Figure 5: .
1 : 2 ≻1 3 ≻1 5 ≻1 1
2 : 1 ≻2 5 ≻2 3 ≻2 0
3 : 4 ≻3 1 ≻3 5 ≻3 2 ≻3 3
4 : 3 ≻4 4
5 : 1 ≻5 3 ≻5 5
1
2
3
4
5
Figure 6: The delegation-acceptability digraph induced by the Euclidean distance on voters in
Figure 5 and the acceptability thresholds of the voters.
The distance is the Euclidean distance, and the acceptability thresholds are: ρ1 = 2 (so 1 accepts
2, 3 and 5 as a guru, but not 4), ρ2 = 1.5, ρ3 = 2, ρ4 = 1 and ρ5 = 1. A partial preference profile
which is DB w.r.t. the Euclidean distance and the acceptability thresholds of the voters is given
in Figure 6, together with its delegation-acceptability digraph (note that the delegation acceptability
digraph is unique given the distance and the acceptability thresholds of the voters).
10.2 Proof of Theorem 7
Theorem 7. MEMB is NP-hard in the case of DB preference profiles, even if there are no
abstainers.
Proof. We build a reduction where the voters are vertices of a graph, and the distance between
voters i and j is the shortest path (number of edges, the graph is unweighted) between the two
vertices representing i and j in the graph.
Let us consider a 3-SAT instance with a set U of variables and a set C of clauses. We consider
a graph made of:
• The undirected version of the graph GU,C associated to (U,C) (see Figure 3 in Section 5);
• Two adjacent vertices vt and vq; vt is also adjacent to all clause vertices vcj .
Thus we have 2nu+nc+2 voters. As we said, we define dist(i, j) as the shortest path between
i and j in the graph. The acceptability threshold is 1 for all voters except vq which has an
acceptability threshold of 2; they all prefer to vote than to abstain.
Let us show that the 3-SAT instance is satisfiable iff the DB preference profile induced by the
corresponding distance admits a Nash-stable delegation function in which vq is a guru.
Assume that there exists a Nash-stable delegation function d in which vq is a guru. As vq is a
guru, then voters vt and vcj , ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , nc} cannot be gurus as they are at a distance of less than
2 from vq. Contrarily to voter vt who accepts to delegate to vq, each voter vc ∈ {vcj |j = 1, . . . , nc}
will necessarily delegate to one of the three voters corresponding to the literals of its clause. Lastly,
note that as vxit and v
x
if are connected for all i ∈ {1, . . . nu}, then at most one of them can be a guru
in a Nash stable delegation function. Furthermore, as the voters vc ∈ {vcj |j = 1, . . . , nc} cannot
be gurus, one voter out of {vxit, v
x
if} will have to be a guru for all i ∈ {1, . . . nu}. Now consider the
truth assignment that sets to true a variable xi iff vxit ∈ Gu(d). It is easy to check that this truth
assignment satisfies each clause in C.
Conversely, if there exists a truth assignment X satisfying each clause in C then consider the
delegation function d such that Gu(d) is composed of vq, all variables vxit such that xi is set to true
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in X and all variables vxif such that xi is set to false in X . For all voters j not in Gu(d), d(j) is
then given by the voter that j prefers in Gu(d). It is easy to see that d is Nash-stable.
10.3 Proof of Theorem 8
Theorem 8. Given a DB preference profile P , a BRD dynamics always converges.
Proof. Let us recall that we assume that each voter has the token infinitely many times. Consider
a DB preference profile P , and a BRD dynamics with a starting delegation d0 and a token function
T . We assume that voters are numbered 1, 2 . . . , n in such a way that ρi ≤ ρi+1, i = 1, . . . , n− 1.
Let us define G as the set of voters which are gurus (vote) infinitely many times in the dynamics:
G = {i1, . . . , is} with i1 ≤ i2 ≤ · · · ≤ is. Note that, obviously, G contains no abstainers. Since
voters in V \ G are gurus finitely many times, let us consider a step t0 such that, for any t ≥ t0,
no voter in V \G are gurus (they always delegate or abstain).
For k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s}, let us now define tk as the first time t > tk−1 such that ik has the token
and decides to vote (thus it is a guru).
We now show by recurrence on k that for any k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s}, any t ≥ tk, ik is a guru at time
t (ik remains a guru forever after time tk).
Consider k = 1. At t1, i1 decides to vote. This means that no voter in Acc(i1) is a guru. Then,
while i1 is a guru:
• no voter j > i1 in Acc(i1) ever becomes a guru: indeed, since ρi are in non decreasing order,
if j ∈ Acc(i1) then i1 ∈ Acc(j). While i1 is a guru j does not decide to vote.
• no voter j < i1 in Acc(i1) ever becomes a guru: indeed, these are in V \G and since t1 ≥ t0
we know that they always delegate or abstain.
Then no voter in Acc(i1) becomes a guru, so i1 will vote (be a guru) forever.
The inductive step is almost similar. Suppose that the claim is true up to k− 1, and consider step
k. At tk, ik decides to vote. This means that no voter in Acc(ik) is a guru. Then, while ik is a
guru:
• no voter j > ik in Acc(ik) ever becomes a guru, for the same reason as previously.
• no voter j < ik in Acc(ik) ever becomes a guru: if j ∈ V \G this follows as previously from
the fact that tk ≥ t0. If j ∈ G, j < ik implies that j = if for some f < k. Then, by
induction, j is a guru forever from step tf < tk, thus she cannot be in Acc(ik) (since at time
tk ik decides to vote).
Thus, at time ts: voters in G are gurus forever, and voters in V \G never become gurus. From
ts we only have to wait for another round that each voter has the token one more time. Gurus will
maintain their choice, while non gurus will choose (thanks to BRD) their most preferred guru in G,
or abstain (if they prefer to abstain than to vote or to delegate to gurus). We reach a Nash-stable
delegation function.
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